University of Chicago Law School

Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
Economics
2008

Happiness and Punishment
John Bronsteen
John.Bronsteen@chicagounbound.edu

Christopher Buccafusco
Christopher.Buccafusco@chicagounbound.edu

Jonathan Masur
dangelolawlib+jonathanmasur@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan Masur, "Happiness and Punishment" (John M. Olin
Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 424, 2008).

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and
Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law
and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

CHICAGO
JOHN M. OLIN LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER NO. 424
(2D SERIES)
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 230

HAPPINESS AND PUNISHMENT
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur

THE LAW SCHOOL
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
August 2008

This paper can be downloaded without charge at the John M. Olin Program in Law and
Economics Working Paper Series: http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and at the
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series:
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection.

Happiness and Punishment
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur†
Now as for the future of reflection about punishment: First, I
think we can look forward to continued valuable illumination
from the social-science disciplines . . . .1

I. INTRODUCTION
When the state punishes a criminal, it purposely inflicts
suffering on one of its citizens. If that act is to be justified, limits must
be set on the amount and type of suffering that may be imposed. A
justification therefore requires an understanding of the ways in which
punishment actually inflicts suffering on those punished. How and to
what extent do fines and incarceration negatively affect happiness or
well-being? The answers might seem obvious, but as we have
indicated in the context of civil settlement,2 recent empirical work in
behavioral psychology suggests otherwise.
This empirical work reveals that people adapt to monetary
fines far better than they expect. Paying a fine initially decreases an
offender’s level of happiness, but that level rebounds quickly toward
its initial state. Even large fines have only minor effects on the wellbeing of those who receive them, because people adjust quite easily to
their new financial circumstances. Adaptation thus reduces heavily
the punitive consequence of a fine.
Prison has a more complicated effect on happiness. On the one
hand, it is similar to a fine in that people adapt well to being in prison.
Their happiness drops at the beginning and they expect it to remain
low, but it rebounds impressively as they adjust to their new
surroundings. On the other hand, virtually any period of incarceration,
no matter how brief, has consequences that negatively affect prisoners’
†

Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Visiting
Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law; and Assistant Professor,
University of Chicago Law School, respectively.
1
Herbert Morris, Concluding Remarks: The Future of Punishment, 46 UCLA L.
Rev. 1927, 1930 (1999).
2
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur, Hedonic
Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, 108 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098271.
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lives in ways that resist adaptation, even after they have been released.
Prisoners are often abandoned by their spouses and friends, face
difficulty finding and keeping employment, and must grapple with
incurable diseases contracted during their incarceration. Thus, living
in prison itself becomes less oppressive with time, but the effects of
having been in prison tend to linger and to diminish happiness
indefinitely.
These results differ dramatically from the standard
assumptions that underlie both penal policy and philosophical
scholarship on punishment. All major accounts of punishment place a
high value on proportionality: more serious crimes warrant more
severe punishment, either to effect greater deterrence, to repay the
offender adequately for her misdeeds, to express the appropriate level
of societal condemnation, or some combination thereof. But owing to
the ways in which people do and do not adapt to various hardships, our
current methods of punishment are too blunt for proportional
punishments to be fashioned.
Contrary to expectations, adjusting the size of a fine or the
length of a prison sentence does not meaningfully adjust the amount of
unhappiness that is ultimately experienced by the offender. Paying
more money or staying in prison for a longer period are highly
susceptible to adaptation. As a result, virtually any fine imposes only
fleeting harm. On the other hand, virtually any term of imprisonment
imposes large and lasting harm by causing disease, unemployment,
and loss of social connection; but longer prison terms do not diminish
happiness much more than do shorter ones. It is therefore impossible
to tailor a punishment to fit the severity of a crime, given the penal
options available.
In addition to depriving punishment of its proportionality,
adaptation has other significant effects. It diminishes the harm
imposed by a monetary fine without diminishing the fine’s capacity to
deter, because would-be offenders will mistakenly expect a large fine
to decrease their happiness substantially. Adaptation to the actual time
spent in prison works similarly, but that phenomenon works at crosspurposes with the fact that post-prison life is worse than has been
assumed by most theorists and legislators. In designing a system of
punishment, scholars and policymakers must account for the
ramifications of hedonic adaptation in order for their penal regimes to
reflect the actual experience of punishment. This necessity holds for
retributive and utilitarian theorists alike.
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Our aim in this article is to use recent psychological findings to
describe more accurately the effects of punishment. In Part I, we
analyze the findings themselves and the studies that give rise to them.
In Part II, we apply the findings to the utilitarian theory of punishment,
and in Part III we apply them to retributive and mixed theories of
punishment. We assess the import of the findings for each theory and
the new challenges they pose for criminal justice.
I. THE HEDONIC CONSEQUENCES OF PUNISHMENT
All leading theories of criminal punishment must be concerned
with the way punishment is subjectively experienced by the offender.3
Until recently, however, little was known about how people responded
to the various punishments inflicted on them. Over the past couple of
decades, and especially in the last few years, an interdisciplinary group
of social scientists has begun to develop techniques for accurately
measuring the subjective pain—physical and psychological—that
punishment inflicts.
This research on the subjective experience of punishment is
part of a larger body of social science research devoted to the
measurement and determinants of subjective well-being.4 Motivated
by the belief that individual self-reports provide the best metrics of
well-being, hedonic psychology (or simply hedonics) has emerged as
one of the most vibrant fields in the behavioral sciences.5 Among its
most robust and consistent findings are two that are highly relevant to
the study of punishment: 1) most life events, whether positive or
negative, exert little lasting effect on an individual’s well-being
because people adapt rapidly to them; and 2) people do not recognize
or remember how quickly they adapt and thus make very poor

3

See Adam Kolber, The Subjective Experience of Punishment, COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090337. Kolber writes,
“[A] successful theory of punishment must take account of offenders’ subjective
experiences when assessing punishment severity.” Id. at 5.
4
See Daniel Kahneman et al., Preface, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY ix (Daniel Kahneman et al., eds. 1999).
5
Hedonic psychology has also had a substantial impact on American popular
culture through works like Malcolm Gladwell’s Blink, Daniel Gilbert’s Stumbling on
Happiness, and Jonathan Haidt’s The Happiness Hypothesis.

Happiness & Punishment

5

estimates about the hedonic impact of future events.6 Studies have
shown that, after immediate, short-term changes, people rapidly return
to prior levels of well-being following experiences ranging from
learning that they scored poorly on a personality test7 to becoming
paraplegic.8
This Part explores evidence for hedonic adaptation to the two
principal forms of punishment used in the United States, monetary
fines and imprisonment.9 Recent social scientific studies support the
notion that criminals adapt extremely rapidly to these punishments,
and that increasing their magnitude, through larger fines or longer
prison terms, will have little effect on the punishments’ overall
hedonic impact. Yet while offenders are likely to adapt quickly to
paying fines and spending time in prison, other research has shown
that incarceration substantially affects ex-inmates for many years
following prison. People who have spent any time in prison are
significantly more likely to experience chronic, stress-related health
impairments, unemployment, and the breakdown of psychologically
vital social ties. Unlike fines and imprisonment itself, these postprison consequences of incarceration are likely to generate substantial
and long-lasting hedonic penalties for ex-inmates regardless of the
lengths of their sentences.
A.

Hedonic Adaptation and Affective Forecasting

In a now-classic study published in 1978, Philip Brickman and
his colleagues compared recent lottery winners and recently paralyzed
6

Timothy D. Wilson et al., Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in Affective
Forecasting, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 821 (2000) (hereinafter
Focalism).
7
Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 617 (1998) (hereinafter
Immune Neglect).
8
C. Lundqvist et al., Spinal Cord Injuries: Clinical, Functional, and Emotional
Status, 16 SPINE 78 (1991).
9
Although we focus on fines and imprisonment, our arguments are certainly
relevant to debates about less traditional forms of punishment, including shaming.
See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
591, 593 (1996). For brevity’s sake, we also do not discuss certain punishments that
are traditionally viewed as lighter than fines, such as probation and community
service. See NORVAL MORRIS & MICHAEL TONRY, BETWEEN PRISON AND
PROBATION: INTERMEDIATE PUNISHMENTS IN A RATIONAL SENTENCING SYSTEM 6-7
(1990).
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paraplegics and quadriplegics with control groups. The lottery
winners were not much happier than the controls, and the accident
victims were considerably happier than anticipated, reporting levels of
well-being above the scale’s midpoint.10 According to Brickman,
these results indicated that people experience life as if on a “hedonic
treadmill” such that positive and negative life events create only
temporary departures from an established well-being set point.11 This
theory has been enormously influential in the social sciences,
particularly as it has challenged the traditional economic
understanding of utility.12 Moreover, it has motivated innumerable
studies exploring the hedonic consequences of a large variety of
events.13
These studies, whether of responses to income gains,14 tenure
denial,15 or disability,16 often report similar findings: “most people are
reasonably happy most of the time, and most events do little to change
that for long.”17 The many studies examining people’s experiences
with disability provide the most compelling evidence.18 For example,
people with spinal cord injuries report levels of well-being similar to
those of healthy controls,19 as do burn victims,20 patients with
colostomies21 and those undergoing dialysis for treatment of kidney
10

See Philip Brickman et al., Lottery Winners and Accident Victims: Is
Happiness Relative?, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 917, 920-21 (1978).
11
See Philip Brickman & Donald Campbell, Hedonic Relativism and Planning
the Good Society, in ADAPTATION LEVEL THEORY: A SYMPOSIUM 287 (M.H. Appley
ed. 1971).
12
See Daniel Kahneman, Objective Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 4, at
13-15.
13
For an early review, see Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Hedonic
Adaptation, in WELL-BEING, supra note 4, at 312.
14
See Richard Easterlin, Explaining Happiness, 100 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 11,176, 11,178 (2003).
15
See Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7, at 622-23.
16
See Andrew J. Oswald & Nattavudh Powdthavee, Does Happiness Adapt? A
Longitudinal Study of Disability With Implications for Economists and Judges, J.
PUB. ECON. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=921040.
17
Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7, at 618.
18
For a review of these studies and their implications for legal settlement, see
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, & Masur, supra note 2, at 4-12.
19
See Lundqvist et al., supra note 8, at 80.
20
David R. Patterson et al., Psychological Effects of Severe Burn Injuries, 113
PSYCHOL. BULL. 362, 362 (1993).
21
Norman F. Boyd et al., Whose Utilities for Decision Analysis?, 10 MED.
DECISION MAKING 58, 66 (1990).
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disorders.22 In the most recent longitudinal study of adaptation,
economists tracked the subjective well-being ratings of people who
subsequently became disabled and remained so. They found that in
only two years, subjects had substantially adapted to their injuries.23
Although the psychological mechanisms underlying hedonic
adaptation remain poorly understood, it seems as if people have a
“psychological immune system” that helps them cope with the effects
of many kinds of events.24
While adaptation seems pervasive, further research has
demonstrated its limits.25 Thus, people are less likely to adapt to some
health-related stimuli like noise,26 chronic headaches,27 and certain
degenerative diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis,28 multiple

22

See Jason Riis et al., Ignorance of Hedonic Adaptation to Hemodialysis: A
Study Using Ecological Momentary Assessment, 134 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 3,
6 (2005).
23
See Oswald & Powdthavee, supra note 16, at 13-14. As a group, people who
became disabled reported an average well-being score of 4.8 for the two years
preceding disability, an abrupt fall to 3.7 at the onset of disability, and then a
subsequent rebound to 4.1 in the next two years despite the fact that the disabilities
themselves had not changed. Separating the moderately and severely disabled
groups, the authors find approximately 50% adaptation to moderate disability and
30% adaptation to severe disability. Thus, there is substantial evidence that hedonic
adaptation to disability is significant (if incomplete). Id.
24
Gilbert, et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7, at 619. They write, “Ego
defense, rationalization, dissonance reduction, motivated reasoning, positive
illusions, self-serving attribution, and self-justification are just some of the terms that
psychologists have used to describe the various strategies, mechanisms, tactics, and
maneuvers of the psychological immune system.” Id. Similarly, Daniel Kahneman
and Richard Thaler note that attention is normally directed towards novelty,
including changes in response to disability. Therefore, “as the new state loses its
novelty it ceases to be the exclusive focus of attention, and other aspects of life again
evoke their varying hedonic responses.” Daniel Kahneman & Richard Thaler, Utility
Maximization and Experienced Utility, 20 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 221, 230 (2006).
These coping strategies are evolutionarily adaptive, allowing people to recover
quickly from considerable misfortune.
25
See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 312.
26
See Neil. D. Weinstein, Community Noise Problems: Evidence Against
Adaptation, 2 J. ENVIR. PSYCHOL. 87, 87 (1992).
27
See Victoria Guitera et al., Quality of Life in Chronic Daily Headache, 58
NEUROLOGY 1062 (2002).
28
See C.A. Smith & K.A. Wallston, Adaptation in Patients with Chronic
Rheumatoid Arthritis: Application of a General Model, 11 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 151,
151 (1992).
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schlerosis,29 HIV/AIDS,30 and hepatitis C infection.31 Additionally,
socially relevant stimuli such as divorce,32 the death of a spouse,33 and
unemployment34 prove incredibly difficult to adapt to, with hedonic
penalties lasting even after remarriage or reemployment.
Although adaptation’s effects are substantial, they are hardly
ever recognized or remembered. Research on affective forecasting –
the ability to predict how future events will make you feel – has
repeatedly shown that people suffer from both impact and duration
biases causing them to overestimate the size and the length of hedonic
experiences.35 For example, people generally predict that becoming
disabled will have an enormous and long-lasting impact on their
happiness, despite the fact that most people adapt rapidly to
disability.36 According to Daniel Gilbert and Timothy Wilson, people
suffer from focusing illusions caused by paying too much attention to
the few changes wrought by new events while ignoring the many
things that remain the same.37
29

See R.F. Antonak & H. Livneh, Psychosocial Adaption to Disability and Its
Investigation Among Persons with Multiple Sclerosis, 40 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1099,
1103 (1995) (reporting that people suffering from MS report higher levels of
depression than healthy people).
30
See Ron D. Hays et al., Health-related Quality of Life in Patients with Human
Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: Results from the HIV Cost
and Services Utilization Study, 108 AM. J. OF MED. 714 (2000).
31
See Judith I. Tsui et al., The Impact of Chronic Hepatitis C on Health-Related
Quality of Life in Homeless and Marginally Housed Individuals with HIV, 11 AIDS
BEHAV. 603 (2007).
32
See Richard. E. Lucas et al., Reexamining Adaptation and the Set Point Model
of Happiness: Reactions to Changes in Marital Status, 84 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 527 (2003).
33
Id.
34
See Richard A. Easterlin, Does Economic Growth Improve the Human Lot?
Some Empirical Evidence, in NATIONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH 89
(P.A. David & M.W. Reder, eds. 1974).
35
See Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting: Knowing
What to Want, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 131 (2005).
36
See Peter A. Ubel et al., Disability and Sunshine: Can Hedonic Predictions Be
Improved by Drawing Attention to Focusing Illusions or Emotional Adaptation?, 11
J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 111, 111 (2005) (“One of the most commonly
replicated ‘happiness gaps’ is that observed between the self-rated quality of life of
people with health conditions and healthy people’s estimates of what their quality of
life would be if they had those conditions . . . .”).
37
See Wilson et al., Focalism, supra note 6, at 822; Daniel T. Gilbert &
Timothy D. Wilson, Prospection: Experiencing the Future, 317 SCIENCE 1351
(2007).
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Significantly for our interests, these findings apply not just to
rare occurrences such as becoming disabled but also to more regularly
recurring events like being dumped by a boy/girlfriend, seeing your
favorite football team lose, and being passed over for a job.38
Learning from past hedonic experiences is rare, because the process of
doing so is complex.39 It requires that people recognize that they have
experienced a similar event in the past, make an effort to remember
how that event made them feel, and accurately recall their reaction.40
The last of these is a particularly steep burden.41 Thus, even people
with substantial previous experience with a stimulus are unlikely to
remember that its hedonic impact was both weaker and shorter than
predicted.
B.

Adaptation to Economic Loss

Perhaps hedonic psychology’s only finding more important—
and more counterintuitive—than adaptation to disability is its
consistent evidence of money’s limited hedonic impact. Since the
economist Richard Easterlin first proposed his “paradox” about the
lack of correlation between income and happiness, numerous studies
have supported the idea that, except below the level of subsistence,
increased income produces very limited gains in subjective wellbeing.42 A variety of explanations for this phenomenon have emerged,
ranging from constantly rising aspiration levels43 to altered social
comparisons,44 but the message is clear: money can’t buy happiness.

38

See Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect, supra note 7.
See Peter Ayton et al., Affective Forecasting: Why Can’t People Predict Their
Emotions?, 13 THINKING & REASONING 62 (2007).
40
Deborah A. Kermer et al., Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17
PSYCHOL. SCI. 649, 652 (2006).
41
See Timothy D. Wilson et al., Lessons From the Past: Do People Learn from
Experience That Emotional Reactions are Short-Lived?, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1648, 1649 (2001). According to Christianson and Safer, “There
are apparently no published studies in which a group of subjects has accurately
recalled the intensity and/or frequency of their previously recorded emotions.”
Quoted in id.
42
For a review of the extensive literature, see Ed Diener & Robert BiswasDiener, Will Money Increase Subjective Well-Being: A Literature Review and Guide
to Needed Research, 57 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 119 (2002).
43
See Easterlin, supra note 14, at 11,178.
44
See Diener & Diener, supra note 42, at 147.
39
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But can losing money make you less happy? There is less
research on the hedonic impact of economic losses, but what does
exist suggests that people adapt to losses much as they do gains.45 In
one study, subjects who lost a $3 gamble had returned very close to
pre-gamble happiness levels in only 10 minutes.46 Although these
amounts and time periods are rather small, the authors extrapolate to
more substantial sums: “even though losing $7,500 does have a larger
hedonic impact than winning $10,000, it probably does not have as
great an impact as people expect.”47 More significantly, Ed Diener
and colleagues tracked people who lost at least half a standard
deviation of their annual income in a longitudinal study over a period
of nine years.48 Not only were these people not unhappier than those
whose incomes didn’t change or whose incomes increased, they were
actually happier.49
As we will explore later, studies such as these call into
question traditional rationales for the imposition of monetary penalties
on criminal offenders. Although such penalties will likely cause
immediate decreases in offenders’ well-being, their effects will
probably be smaller and of shorter duration than predicted. And just
as adding $20,000 to your $100,000 annual salary produces almost no
more happiness than adding $10,000, losing $20,000 is probably not
significantly worse than losing half that amount.
C.

Adaptation to Imprisonment

Monetary fines are regularly used as punishment in the United
States, but imprisonment serves as the “linchpin” of the nation’s
45

It is worth pointing out that hedonic adaptation to losses may not be identical
to adaptation to gains. Research from the field of behavioral decision theory has
repeatedly shown that losses loom larger psychologically than do gains. See Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979). Indeed, losses trigger stronger neural activity than
do gains. See Roy F. Baumeister et al., Bad is Stronger than Good, 5 REV. GEN.
PSYCHOL. 323 (2001); John T. Cacioppo & G.G. Bernston, Relationship Between
Attitudes and Evaluative Space: A Critical Review With Emphasis on the
Separability of Positive and Negative Substrates, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 401 (1994).
46
See Kermer et al., supra note 40, at 651.
47
Id. at 652.
48
Ed Diener et al., The Relationship Between Income and Subjective WellBeing: Relative or Absolute?, 28 SOC. INDICATORS RES. 195 (1993).
49
Id. at 209 (although not statistically significantly so).
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response to crime,50 and understanding its effects on offenders is
essential.
Social scientific interest in prisoners’ responses to
incarceration began in the 1950s following Donald Clemmer’s theory
of prisonization, the steady deterioration in prisoners’ physical and
psychological health over the course of a sentence.51 More recently,
however, these findings have been challenged by consistent evidence
that prisoners rapidly adapt to incarceration.52 As with adaptation in
other domains, incarceration typically results in substantial
psychological distress upon imprisonment followed quickly by rapid
gains in well-being and little further change throughout the term.53
An early cross-sectional study compared inmates who had
served one year of a long-term sentence with those who had served
nine years of such a sentence.54 The recently incarcerated offenders
exhibited significantly higher levels of self-reported anxiety,
depression, and psychosomatic illnesses than the longer serving
inmates.55 According to the authors:
These results suggest that the early period of incarceration
is particularly stressful for long-term offenders as they
50

F.T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27
CRIME & JUSTICE: A REV. OF RES. 1, 2 (2000).
51
See DONALD CLEMMER, THE PRISON COMMUNITY 299 (1958).
52
See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 311-12. They write,
“Although incarceration is designed to be unpleasant, most of the research on
adjustment to prison life points to considerable adaptation following a difficult initial
adjustment period.” Id. at 311. For an early review of the literature, see Lee H.
Bukstel & Peter R. Kilmann, Psychological Effects of Imprisonment on Confined
Individuals, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 469 (1980). The authors find no support for “the
popular notion that correctional confinement is harmful to most individuals.” Id. at
487.
53
See Timothy J. Flanagan, The Pains of Long-Term Imprisonment, 20 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 148 (1980); Doris L. MacKenzie & Lynne Goodstein, Long-term
Incarceration Impacts and Characteristics of Long-term Offenders, 12 CRIM. JUST.
& BEHAV. 395 (1985); EDWARD ZAMBLE & FRANK J. PORPORINO, COPING,
BEHAVIOR, AND ADAPTATION IN PRISON INMATES (1988) (hereinafter COPING);
Edward Zamble & Frank Porporino, Coping, Imprisonment, and Rehabilitation:
Some Data and Their Implications, 17 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 53 (1990) (hereinafter
Coping & Rehabilitation); Edward Zamble, Behavior and Adaptation in Long-Term
Prison Inmates: Descriptive Longitudinal Results, 19 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 409
(1992); Mandeept K. Dhami et al., Adaptation to Imprisonment: Indigenous or
Imported?, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1085 (2007).
54
See MacKenzie & Goodstein, supra note 53, at 401.
55
Id. at 407.
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make the transition from the outside world to institutional
life. No evidence supports the notion of psychological
deterioration over time. Instead, with more time served,
long termers appear to develop strategies for coping with
prison.56
This evidence for adaptation to prison has been bolstered by
longitudinal studies tracking inmates across prison terms.57 One such
study surveyed a group of prisoners regularly over six years. As in the
cross-sectional studies, the researchers found that prisoners
interviewed in their first month of incarceration showed high levels of
depression and anxiety, but, within a few months, the prisoners’ selfreported mental health had improved substantially.58 Moreover,
inmates’ reports of their well-being also rose.59 In interviews
conducted during their first month in prison, inmates reported a mean
quality of life (QoL) score of 32.2 out of 100, with more than twothirds reporting their QoL below the midpoint of the scale.60 After six
months in prison, inmates’ QoL reports rose to 38.3, and six years into
their sentences, inmates had improved to 42.0, with most reporting
their QoL above the scale’s midpoint.61
From these studies a pattern of hedonic response to
imprisonment emerges. Initial entry into the prison environment
triggers significant psychological distress and low levels of wellbeing. Within weeks, however, inmates develop coping mechanisms
that enable them to adjust to the situation and improve their wellbeing.62 After this initial adjustment period, offenders maintain
56
57

Id. at 409.
See ZAMBLE & PORPORINO, COPING, supra note 53; Dhami et al., supra note

53.
58

See Zamble & Porporino, Coping & Rehabilitation, supra note 53, at 64;
ZAMBLE & PORPORINO, COPING, supra note 53, at 109. They note that only “3
months later there was generally some amelioration of the emotional disturbances
seen at the beginning of the term.” Id.
59
See Zamble, supra note 53, at 417.
60
Id.
61
Id. The percentage of inmates reporting that “there are no good things” about
being in prison also dropped over the six-year period from 48 to 8. Id. See also
Dhami et al., supra note 53, at 1097 (noting, “prisoners with a poor quality of life
before prison felt happier than before”).
62
As early as the 16th century, Thomas More recognized prison’s limited impact
on his own well-being, writing, from his cell to his wife, “is not this house as nigh
heaven as my own?” Quoted in ANTHONY KENNY & CHARLES KENNY, LIFE,
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relatively constant levels of happiness throughout the remainder of
their terms.63
Thus, the “pains of imprisonment”64 are felt
immediately, with diminishing hedonic penalties over the remainder of
the sentence.
D.

The Long-Term Effects of Prison on Well-Being

Although being in prison seems to produce only limited
hedonic deficits for inmates, it is becoming increasingly clear that
having been in prison, for any length of time, has severe, long-lasting
effects on post-incarceration well-being. Researchers have discovered
that any amount of incarceration creates a significantly higher
likelihood that ex-inmates will suffer a variety of health, economic,
and social harms that will prove extremely difficult to adapt to.
Until very recently, it was widely believed that incarceration
produced no direct, causal effects on ex-inmates’ health, employment,
and family lives.65 Any correlation between imprisonment and poor
health or job prospects was thought to be the result of selection effects,
i.e., the people who ended up in prison disproportionately came from
groups with bad health and employment opportunities to begin with.66
In the past few years, however, researchers hit on the idea of applying
the same longitudinal surveys used to study well-being to track
offenders in the years before and after imprisonment and thus isolate
the effects of imprisonment itself.67
LIBERTY, AND THE PURSUIT OF UTILITY: HAPPINESS IN PHILOSOPHICAL AND
ECONOMIC THOUGHT, 59-60 (2006).
63
There is, however, some evidence that the final few weeks of the sentence
prove stressful and thus decreases well-being. See Bukstel & Kilmann, supra note
52, at 488. They write, “The typical pattern among these individuals might involve
an initial adjustment reaction to incarceration, followed by a period of successful
adjustment with another mild psychological reaction (e.g., ‘short-timer’s syndrome’)
occurring just prior to release.” Id.
64
See GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES: A STUDY OF A
MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON (1958).
65
See Jason Schnittker & Andrea John, Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term
Effects of Incarceration on Health, 48 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 115, 117 (2007)
(noting that “the idea that incarceration is not causally related to health is already
well accepted”).
66
Id.
67
See id.; BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006)
(tracking employment prospects and wage growth of ex-inmates); Michael
Massoglia, Incarceration as Exposure: The Prison, Infectious Disease, and Other
Stress-Related Illnesses, 49 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 56 (2008) (studying health
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Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth,
Michael Massoglia has found that ex-inmates have a much higher
likelihood of reporting health problems associated with stress and
communicable diseases in the years following incarceration.68 They
are more than twice as likely to report hepatitis C infections,
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and urinary tract infections.69 Moreover,
they report substantially higher levels of chronic headaches, sleeping
problems, dizziness, and heart problems.70 Considering the high
incidence of prison sexual violence71 and the many stressors
associated with post-prison life, 72 these results should not be
surprising. What is surprising, however, is evidence from Massoglia
and others that the incidence and severity of these health problems are
unrelated to sentence length.73 Thus, any contact with the prison
system, no matter how brief, exposes offenders to worse postincarceration health outcomes.

effects of imprisonment) (hereinafter Exposure); Michael Massoglia, Incarceration,
Health, and Racial Disparities in Health, 42 L. & SOC. REV. 275 (2008) (the same)
(hereinafter Disparities); Leonard M. Lopoo & Bruce Western, Incarceration and
the Formation and Stability of Marital Unions, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 721 (2005).
In the descriptions of these studies, it should be assumed unless otherwise stated that
the results control for a variety of variables including age, gender, education level,
health, etc. For specific control variables, please consult the individual studies.
68
Massoglia, Exposure, supra note 67, at 57.
69
Massoglia, Disparities, supra note 67, at 296.
70
Massoglia, Exposure, supra note 67, at 65. It is worth noting, however, that
imprisonment does not result in higher incidences of all health problems. Id.
71
See Tonisha R. Jones & Travis C. Pratt, The Prevalence of Sexual Violence in
Prison, 52 Int. J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR. CRIMINOLOGY 280, 289
(2008). They write, “the research indicates that such studies typically report prison
sexual victimization rates of around 20%, suggesting that prison sexual victimization
is a significant problem to be addressed.” Id.
72
Massoglia notes, “the experience of incarceration likely acts as a primary
stressor, while characteristics of life after release—stigma, decreased earnings and
employment prospects, and family problems—are a series of secondary stressors.”
Massoglia, Exposure, supra note 67, at 57.
73
Id. at 61. According to Massoglia, “exposure to incarceration, rather than
length of incarceration, appears to be more important to the relationship between
incarceration and health problems.” Id. Schnittker and John’s findings concur:
“[T]he effects of incarceration are such that contact with the prison system is
generally more important than the amount.” Schnittker & John, supra note 65, at
125.

Happiness & Punishment

15

Studies examining ex-inmates’ employment prospects report
similar findings.74 Felony imprisonment results in social stigma, the
erosion of job skills, and disqualification from stable government and
union jobs.75 Accordingly, former prisoners experience lower wages,
slower wage growth, and, importantly, greater unemployment.
According to Bruce Western, their average annual number of weeks
worked dropped from 35 before imprisonment to 23 after,76 and they
tended to have much shorter job tenure.77 Additionally, imprisonment
was related to poor employment continuity for many years after
release.78 After release, offenders are typically shunted into secondary
labor markets with little job security, little opportunity for
advancement, and miniscule earnings.79
Recent research also reveals that ex-inmates are more likely to
experience substantial disruptions in their post-incarceration family
and social lives.80 Imprisonment makes communication with family
and friends difficult and cohabitation with spouses and children
impossible.81 Moreover, imprisonment likely hinders community
74

See WESTERN, supra note 67, at 116; Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market
Consequences of Incarceration, 47 Crime & Delinquency 410 (2000); Jeffrey R.
Kling, Incarceration Length, Employment, and Earnings, 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 863
(2006); see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN
ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007).
75
See Western et al., supra note 74, at 412. They write, “incarceration can
interrupt young men’s transition to stable career employment. The inaccessibility of
career jobs to ex-inmates can be explained in several ways. The stigma of
incarceration makes ex-inmates unattractive for entry-level or union jobs that may
require high levels of trust. In addition, civil disabilities limit ex-felons’ access to
career employment in skilled trades or the public sector. . . . Ex-offenders are then
relegated to spot markets with little prospect for earnings growth.” Id. at 414.
76
WESTERN, supra note 67, at 116.
77
Id. at 123.
78
Id. at 121.
79
Western compared hypothetical workers differing only regarding past
imprisonment and found that a “thirty-year-old black high school dropout, for
example, earns on average nearly $9,000 annually, with incarceration resulting in a
reduction of about $3,300. The parallel white earnings average $14,400, and the
reduction about $5,200.” Id. at 120. He continues, “Without incarceration, 4 percent
of young blacks—one-fifth of all poor blacks—would be lifted out of poverty, and
the poverty rate would fall to 14.5 percent.” Id. at 127.
80
See id. at 146-47; Lopoo & Western, supra note 67; Beth M. Huebner, The
Effect of Incarceration on Marriage and Work Over the Life Course, 22 JUST. Q. 281
(2005).
81
See Schnittker & John, supra note 65, at 117.
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integration, trust, and intimacy.82 Accordingly, men who have spent
time in prison are less likely to get married than similar men who have
not, and they are more than twice as likely to get divorced than their
never-incarcerated peers.83
As bad as these health, employment, and social consequences
of imprisonment seem, there would seem to be little reason to be
concerned about them in light of humans’ uncanny ability to adapt
hedonically. But as mentioned above, certain experiences are difficult
or impossible to adapt to and cause long-lasting diminutions in wellbeing. The effects of imprisonment—chronic and deteriorating illness,
unemployment, and the loss of family and social ties—have all been
found to be particularly resistant to adaptation.
The health problems that imprisonment exposes inmates to,
including chronic headaches, hepatitis C, HIV, and tuberculosis,
significantly and consistently diminish self-reported quality of life in
sufferers, even with treatment.84 People who become unemployed end
up with lower baseline levels of happiness, and these decreases last
even after they find new jobs.85 Additionally, longer terms of
unemployment result in more intense well-being penalties.86 And
although economic losses above the poverty line generally do not
cause significant changes in well-being, many ex-inmates are likely to
82

Id.
See WESTERN, supra note 67, at 146-48.
84
See Guitera et al., supra note 27, at 1062; Tsui et al., supra note 31, at 603;
Hays et al., supra note 30, at 714.
85
See Richard A. Lucas et al., Unemployment Alters the Set Point for Life
Satisfaction, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI. 8, 11 (2004); Richard A. Lucas, Adaptation and the
Set-Point Model of Subjective Well-Being, 16 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL.
SCI. 75, 77 (2007); Andrew E. Clark et al., Lags and Leads in Life Satisfaction: A
Test of the Baseline Hypothesis, 118 ECON. J. F222, F231 (2008); Michael Argyle,
Causes and Correlates of Happiness, in WELL-BEING, supra note 4, at 362-63.
Lucas et al. write:
The experience of unemployment did, on average, alter people’s setpoint levels of life satisfaction. People were less satisfied in the years
following unemployment than they were before unemployment, and this
decline occurred even though individuals eventually regained employment.
Furthermore, the changes from baseline were very stable from the reaction
period to the adaptation period—individuals who experienced a large drop
in satisfaction during unemployment were very likely to be far from
baseline many years after becoming reemployed.
Lucas et al, supra, at 11. Or as Clark et al. put it, “unemployment starts off bad and
pretty much stays bad.” Clark et al., supra, at F231.
86
See Lucas et al, supra note 85, at 10.
83
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find themselves in the lowest part of the income curve where wage
differences matter.87
Imprisonment’s impact on ex-inmates’ family and social lives
is likely to have the most severe consequences for well-being due to its
multiple effects. First, the increased likelihood of divorce will have
direct effects on well-being, because adaptation to divorce is often
slow and incomplete.88 Additionally, strong social and family ties
have been shown to encourage adaptation,89 and the disruptions
inflicted by incarceration will be deleterious to a prisoner’s ability to
adapt to other negative events.90 Finally, a variety of learned
behaviors that enable inmates to cope with the experience of
incarceration, including mistrust, blunted emotions, and lack of
planning, are likely to prove maladaptive “on the outside.”91
In the years following release from prison, ex-inmates are
likely to suffer from a variety of problems that cause long-lasting
diminution of their well-being. Working alone or in tandem, the
negative health, employment, and social effects of imprisonment have
severe consequences for lifelong happiness independent of the length
of a prisoner’s incarceration. Although offenders are capable of
rapidly adapting to being in prison, they have little hope of adapting to
the penalties prison imposes on their health, work, and family lives.
*
87

*

*

See WESTERN, supra note 67, at 127.
See Richard A. Lucas, Time Does Not Heal All Wounds: A Longitudinal Study
of Reaction and Adaptation to Divorce, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 945 (2005); David R.
Johnson & Jian Wu, An Empirical Test of Crisis, Social Selection, and Role
Explanations of the Relationship Between Marital Disruption and Psychological
Distress: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis of Four-Wave Panel Data, 64 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 211 (2002).
89
See, e.g., Argyle, supra note 85, at 363 (noting that the “effects of
unemployment are greater if there is little social support”).
90
See Frederick & Loewenstein, supra note 13, at 314-15.
91
See Schnittker & John, supra note 65, at 126-27. They write:
For example, relinquishing initiative and relying on external constraints
may be rewarded in a prison setting, but these characteristics can be
problematic in a home or workplace. By the same token, vigilance,
mistrust, and blunted emotions might help prisoners to cope with an
especially violent environment. These dispositions might also, however,
elevate risk for cardiovascular disease and other stress-related illnesses.
Id. at 126; see also Zamble & Porporino, Coping & Rehabilitation, supra note 53, at
68.
88
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Contemporary punishment theories all require knowledge of
the offender’s subjective experience of punishment, but until very
recently, scientific data on punishment’s effects was unavailable. New
research can now provide some of that data, and recent findings
challenge fundamental intuitions about how punishment inflicts
suffering. Central to this research is the phenomenon of hedonic
adaptation. Many life events, including economic losses and time
spent incarcerated, produce only fleeting impacts on reported
happiness. Moreover, due to the rapidity and strength of adaptation,
even substantial differences in the sizes of penalties, whether larger
fines or longer prison terms, fail to generate significantly different
hedonic effects. Yet while inmates quickly adjust to being in prison,
incarceration causes a variety of long-term consequences that are
resistant to hedonic adaptation and that are unrelated to sentence
length. Thus, the hedonic impact of all fines is relatively equal and
smaller than predicted, and the impact of all terms of imprisonment is
relatively equal and big but not in the way imagined.
II. ADAPTATION, FORECASTING ERRORS, AND ASYMMETRY IN
UTILITARIAN CALCULATIONS OF PUNISHMENT
In this Part, we apply the foregoing research on hedonism and
hedonic adaptation to utilitarian theories of punishment. We find that
adaptation to imprisonment itself may enable deterrence at a lower
utilitarian cost than was previously believed possible. At the same
time, however, the hedonic effects of incarceration on post-prison life
may produce the opposite effect.
The social and economic
dislocations caused by felony convictions may be imposing
hedonically excessive punishments while simultaneously inhibiting
efforts to appropriately calibrate deterrence of both first-time offenders
and recidivists.
A. Utilitarian Theory and the Linkage of Deterrence and Pain
The goal of utilitarianism, in the words of its founder, Jeremy
Bentham, “is to augment the total happiness of the community; and
therefore, in the first place to exclude, as far as may be, every thing
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that tends to subtract from that happiness.”92 In designing and
analyzing systems of criminal punishment, utilitarian theorists are thus
primarily concerned with achieving adequate and effective
deterrence—of setting punishment at a level sufficiently high to
dissuade potential offenders from committing crime.93 Among
utilitarians, the temptation to impose increasingly harsher penalties is
strong and omnipresent. The optimal social frequency of most crimes
is exactly zero; the country would likely be better off if there were no
murders, no armed robberies, no assaults, and so forth.94 This is by
92

Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation, in JEREMY BENTHAM & JOHN STUART MILL, THE UTILITARIANS 162,
166 (1961).
93
Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, Pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 3, in J.
BENTHAM’S WORKS 396, 402 (1843) (“If the apparent magnitude, or rather value of
that pain be greater than the apparent magnitude or value of the pleasure or good he
expects to be the consequence of the act, he will be absolutely prevented from
performing it.”); HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 806 (1953) (“If I were having a
philosophical talk with a man I was going to have hanged (or electrocuted) I should
say, I don't doubt that your act was inevitable for you but to make it more avoidable
by others we propose to sacrifice you to the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you like. But the law must keep its
promises.”). Utilitarians have focused in addition on two other related objectives,
incapacitation of dangerous persons and rehabilitation of criminals in order to render
them suitable to re-enter society. These goals of punishment have crept out of favor,
however, as prisons have proven to be poor vehicles for reforming offenders, Robert
Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 36 PUB.
INT. 22 (1974) (arguing that rehabilitative efforts have failed to accomplish their
goals), and incapacitation has had little noticeable effect on the rates of serious
crimes. FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION 100–27 (1995)
(finding that increased incarceration rates in California led to a 15% decrease in
overall crime rates but did not influence the rates of violent crimes such as assaults,
robberies, and murders); John J. DiIulio, Jr., Two Million Prisoners Are Enough,
WALL STREET JOURNAL, March 12, 1999. Rehabilitation and incapacitation also
declined as working theories of punishment because they could offer no response to
the critique that they seemed to compel excessive and indefinite punishment of even
minor crimes. Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475
(1968). We focus here upon deterrence, which remains the principal utilitarian goal
of punishment. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2) (“The general purposes of
the provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of offenders are: (a) to
prevent the commission of offenses . . . .”).
94
We exploit here the definition of a “murder” or other type of crime.
Obviously there are circumstances in which killings will be welfare-enhancing, but
those justified killings are not properly classified as murder. By definition, “murder”
includes only unjustified killings. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(1) (“Conduct
which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to
another is justifiable . . . .”).
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contrast to the civil tort context, where the threat of over-deterrence is
a persistent problem.95 (Imagine the economic damage if the
punishment for causing a car accident were set at $1 million and
people ceased driving.) Because most crimes must be intentional, and
because the majority of them deviate so strongly from acceptable
norms of conduct—robbery and assault do not resemble socially
permitted conduct, while negligent driving at least bears a resemblance
to safe driving—there is less fear that some socially productive
activity will be chilled through stiff penalties on crime.
Rather, from a utilitarian perspective, the most significant
check on the degree of punishment is the cost associated with the
punishment itself.96 Part of that cost derives from the public expense
of detecting, trying, and imprisoning a criminal,97 and part of it relates
to the opportunity cost of removing individuals from the workforce
and transferring them to comparatively unproductive confinement.98
For present purposes, however, the most important component of these
costs is the pain inflicted upon the criminal himself.99 For a strict
utilitarian, the criminal’s welfare is part of the overall calculus:100 the
95

See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–71
(2007) (describing the theory of optimal tort damages).
96
See Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 68 (2005)
(explaining that most modern systems set punishment “not only [by reference to]
traditional crime-control purposes such as deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation, but also a concept known as parsimony—a preference for the least
severe alternative that will achieve the purposes of the sentence”). A second
important consideration is the need to achieve marginal deterrence; we address this
point in greater detail in section II.C., infra.
97
See Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates:
Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Litigation, 111 Q.J. ECON. 319 (1996)
(analyzing the cost to taxpayers of incarceration).
98
See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 193 (1968) (“[I]n the United States in 1965, about $1 billion was
spent on ‘correction,’ and this estimate excludes, of course, the value of the loss in
offenders’ time.”).
99
We employ the feminine pronoun here because it is our preferred convention,
despite the fact that the vast majority of prisoners are male and the behavioral studies
we discuss employed only male subjects.
100
Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals, 94 YALE L.J.
315, 320 (1984) (“Traditionally, utilitarians have begun with the premise that the
criminal justice system should minimize the sum of the costs of crime and crime
prevention. Since everyone's welfare is included in the social calculus, the cost of
crime prevention includes . . . also the suffering imposed upon criminals made to
undergo punishment.”); Margery Fry, Bentham and English Penal Reform, in
JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE LAW 28 (1948) (“the suffering of a punished criminal
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utilitarian goal is to increase the overall welfare of society, and the
criminal, despite her deviance from societal norms, remains a part of
that society.
Accordingly, deterrence and social cost have typically been
thought to move in a type of proportionate lock-step. The greater the
deterrence effect desired, the greater the necessary punishment; but as
punishment (and consequently deterrence) increases, so too does the
social price paid to purchase that deterrence. Utilitarian legislators
who draft sentencing codes, and utilitarian judges who impose
sentences, are thus forced to come to some sort of accommodation
between the twin goals of achieving deterrence and of lessening the
social price paid for punishment, and much of the struggle in setting
appropriate levels of punishment centers around this difficult question
of balancing.101
Utilitarian theorists have heretofore assumed that the deterrent
“punch” of punishment was equal to the pain that punishment inflicted
upon an offender, and that, fundamentally, deterrence could not be
uncoupled from its utilitarian cost. If a lawmaker or judge wished to
obtain additional deterrence power by increasing the punishment for
some crime, she could not avoid the cost of imposing it upon the
criminals who broke the law regardless. The utilitarian pain inflicted
by punishment was, by this accounting, the necessary purchase price
of deterrence. Yet new theories of hedonic adaptation cast doubt upon
this formerly immutable principle.

goes duly down on the debit side, and must be balanced by some greater good in the
credit column”); Levitt, supra note 97, at 347 (acknowledging that typical studies
may underestimate the costs of incarceration because of the unacknowledged “pain
and suffering of prisoners and their families”); R. B. Brandt, Conscience (Rule)
Utilitarianism and the Criminal Law, 14 L. & PHILOSOPHY, 65, 73 (1995)
(referencing “harm to . . . convicted criminals”); Carl Emigholz, Note,
Utilitarianism, Retributivism and the White Collar-Drug Crime Sentencing
Disparity: Toward a Unified Theory of Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 583, 599
(2006) (“In the utilitarian calculus, the criminal justice system implicates a negative
social cost: the crime . . . and pain inflicted upon the criminal as a result of the meted
punishment.”).
101
Compare MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(2)(a) (listing “to prevent the
commission of offenses” as the first purpose of the Code sections governing
punishment) with id. § 1.02(2)(c) (stating that the third purpose of the same sections
is “to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or arbitrary
punishment”) (emphasis added).
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Deterrence, Cost, and Adaptation to Punishment

As we discuss in Part I, new evidence regarding hedonic
adaptation gives rise to strong inferences that people will adapt over
time to criminal punishment, whether that punishment takes the form
of a monetary penalty or a prison sentence. That is to say, the
convicted criminal’s felt experience of punishment will diminish in
severity over time: both the prisoner and the recipient of a fine will be
happier one year after the punishment is imposed than she was after
one day, even if the prisoner remains behind bars and irrespective of
whether the fined criminal has recovered any of the lost funds.102
This adaptation, and the forecasting errors that accompany it,
sever the close linkage between the deterrent power of punishment and
its cost. Regardless of the duration of punishment, criminals will feel
it less harshly than they (or anyone else) expected. At the same time,
they will fail to anticipate their own adaptation, even if they are repeat
offenders who have been punished before.103 Indeed, criminals and
the people who sanction them—juries, judges, and legislators—will
make the same ex ante errors in failing to forecast adaptation.
Deterrence is, of course, an ex ante phenomenon—putative criminals
decide which course of action to pursue based upon their expected
outcomes. Consequently, criminals will be deterred to the same extent
that they would be in the absence of adaptation. Punishment will
serve its primary purpose, but at lower cost than anyone had
anticipated.
1.

Total Pain

When deciding upon a punishment, policymakers—the
legislators who design the system of punishment and set its metes and
bounds, and the judges who impose punishment—must consider the
effect of that punishment upon the criminal herself. From a
consequentialist perspective, the harm inflicted upon the criminal
serves as a type of check on the appropriate severity of a sentence and
a cost to be minimized wherever possible.104 A policymaker imposing
102

See supra notes 42–64 and accompanying text.
See Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 35; Ubel, supra
note 36, at 111; Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection, supra note 37.
104
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2008) (“The court shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary . . . .”); Model Penal Code § 1.02(2) (“The
103
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a sentence necessarily must believe that she can anticipate—within
reasonable bounds—the severity of that sentence and the pain that it
will inflict. (Sentencing would otherwise constitute an entirely
random exercise.) One component of that predictability is the
assumption that the severity of a sentence will scale approximately
proportionately to its length or, in the case of a fine, its amount.
Adaptation uproots this assumption. As we describe above,
people suffer from biases when predicting both the intensity and the
duration of punishment. They will believe it to be worse than it truly
is, even initially, and they will anticipate that it will last longer than it
does in fact.105 Thus, prison and punitive fines will impose smaller
hedonic costs upon their recipients than expected, and those costs will
ameliorate over time; two years in prison are not twice as painful as
one year. As prisoners adapt, they likely return to hedonic states that
more closely resemble their pre-prison experiences.
As a consequence, policymakers’ forecasting errors (coupled
with prisoners’ adaptation) introduce a systematic bias into their
estimations of the effect of punishment. Punishment—whether by fine
or by imprisonment—is simply not as painful as they believe or
predict. In section II.B.2 below we discuss the potential negative
ramifications of this bias, but for the moment we note only its
beneficial impact: any given punishment imposes less pain upon the
recipient and exacts a smaller utilitarian cost than previously
believed.
For a consequentialist, this promises a meaningful
improvement over the perceived status quo.
2.

Deterrence

The usual corollary to this decreasing punishment would be a
concomitant diminishment in its deterrent power—a negative
repercussion by nearly any accounting. But here there exists an
important asymmetry between deterrence and the felt experience of
punishment. A proper accounting of punishment’s hedonic cost can
be made only ex post—after the punishment has already been
administered. Hedonic adaptation will lessen the impact of that

general purposes of the provisions governing the sentencing and treatment of
offenders are: . . . (c) to safeguard offenders against excessive, disproportionate or
arbitrary punishment . . . .”); supra note 100 and accompanying text.
105
Wilson & Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, supra note 35.
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punishment over time, and so this ex post accounting will necessarily
include the ameliorating effects of that adaptation.
Deterrence, on the other hand, is an ex ante phenomenon: the
important issue is what punishment the prospective criminal believes
she will suffer if she is caught and punished, not the punishment that
she eventually receives.106 In the ex ante position, the criminal will
not anticipate her adaptation to punishment. Quite to the contrary, she
will be subject to a focusing illusion as to that punishment’s severity;
her expectation of the punishment will far exceed what she will, in
fact, experience.107 At the same time, the policymakers charged with
meting out punishments—legislators, judges, and juries—will be
subject to the same focusing illusions. They will similarly fail to
anticipate the criminal’s adaptation, and they will imagine a
punishment to be harsher than it actually is. Criminals and the people
charged with punishing them may differ in their evaluations of
punishment on other grounds—criminals may have higher discount
rates than policymakers expect,108 or they may have more information
as to the conditions of confinement109—but along the dimension of
106

Our account in this respect differs from the very interesting points made by
Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral
Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD. 173, 188–89 (2004). Robinson and
Darley suggest in passing that adaptation to prison will inhibit deterrence, id., but
they do not account for the fact that putative criminals will evaluate whether or not
to commit a crime before they have been incarcerated, and thus before they learn that
they will adapt. In addition, even potential recidivists will forget about their own
adaptation once they have been released; without this learning, they will be subject
to the full deterrence force of threatened punishment each subsequent time they
contemplate a crime. See infra notes 111–112 and accompanying text.
107
Gilbert & Wilson, Prospection, supra note 37.
108
That is to say, by comparison to the general population, criminals may
weight the present far more heavily than the future when deciding upon a course of
action. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD HERRNSTEIN, CRIME AND
HUMAN NATURE (1985); see also David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, Crime,
Punishment, and Myopia 4, 30 (unpublished manuscript 2005), available at
http://www.columbia.edu/?~wbm2103/?Courses/Papers-SLEPP/Lee-NBER11491.pdf (demonstrating that hyperbolic discount is more common among
criminals than the general population); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1539–40 (1998). See also David
Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443, 445-46
(1997).
109
See Ascanio Piomelli, Foucault’s Approach to Power: Its Allure and Limits
for Professional Lawyering, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 395, 470 n.346 (2004) (noting
prisoners’ first-hand information regarding the conditions of confinement); Daniel
M. Donovan, Jr., Note: Constitutionality of Regulations Restricting Prisoner
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hedonic forecasting they will behave similarly.110 Hedonic adaptation
thus introduces not an interpersonal asymmetry, but an intertemporal
one: criminals may experience punishment differently than they
anticipated at an earlier point in time, but different people forecasting
the impact of punishment at the same moment will reach similar
conclusions.
This felicitous asymmetry is threatened, however, by the
prospect that recidivist criminals might learn from their past
experiences. Having once experienced punishment (and the attendant
adaptation), the criminal might understand that she will learn to
accommodate the punishment she receives and that the initial shock of
being thrown into prison or fined a large amount will soon dissipate.
Such information, in the hands of repeat offenders, would diminish the
deterrent power of punishment, perhaps substantially. Yet remarkably
this learning does not take place, as we note above.111 People, as a
general rule, do not remember their adaptive responses to negative
stimuli.112 They report their experiences to others as having been
worse than they really were, and they do not draw upon their
experiences to make more accurate predictions on subsequent
occasions. Because they do not learn, they cannot disseminate any
information about adaptation effects to the broader community, which
remains similarly ignorant. The consequence is that affective
forecasting errors are remarkably consistent over time: having
overestimated the harshness of prison once, people are likely to do so
again, and to similar degree. The intertemporal asymmetry introduced
by adaptation is resistant to even a particular individual’s life
experience.

Correspondence with the Media, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1991)
(describing the informational value of prisoners’ letters from prison).
110
No study has yet observed any differences in how various groups of people
experience adaptation or forecast their future happiness. See, e.g., Nick Sevdalis &
Nigel Harvey, Predicting Preferences: A Neglected Aspect of Shared DecisionMaking, 9 HEALTH EXPECTATIONS 245, 248 (2006) (finding no evidence that
“doctors are better equipped than their patients to judge the latter's future ‘best
interests’”). This is not to say that such differences cannot exist—and these
conclusions are certainly tentative, pending future research—but at the moment there
is no reason to believe that they do.
111
Ayton et al., supra note 39.
112
Wilson et al., Lessons From the Past, supra note 41, at 1649.

Happiness & Punishment

3.

26

Adaptation Effects in Combination

Viewed side-by-side, these two consequences of adaptation—
that people adapt but fail to anticipate their adaptation—have
significant ramifications for utilitarian theories of punishment.
Adaptation severs the linkage between deterrence and the pain
inflicted upon a criminal: policymakers are able to achieve adequate
deterrence at a lower cost than was believed possible. As a result,
consequentialist calculations of the costs of punishment have been
skewed upwards. A proper cost-benefit accounting of various forms
and methods of punishment—be they monetary fines or terms of
imprisonment—must include the power of adaptation to lessen the
burden of punishment as the criminal experiences it, while
simultaneously obscuring that anticipated advantage from the criminal
both before and after the fact. For the utilitarian punishment theorist,
hedonic adaptation appears to represent an essentially unalloyed good.
C.

The Post Hoc Effects of Confinement

The previous sections were concerned only with the effects of
adaptation upon a criminal’s felt reaction to a particular punishment
itself—i.e., the criminal’s experience while in prison or in coping with
a punitive fine. With respect to imprisonment, however, the hedonic
impact of punishment does not conclude when the prisoner is released.
A convicted felon feels the lingering after-effects of imprisonment in
nearly every area of her life, ranging from legal, to social, to
economic.
In many cases, these ongoing ramifications of
imprisonment are not easily adaptable. Consequently, prison holds the
capacity to impose hedonic harms beyond what a simple snapshot of
life in prison would reveal.
The social and economic effects of having served time in
prison can be extremely serious.113 As we outline in Part I, prisoners
113

A lengthy prison term—or, more accurately, the state of being a “convicted
felon”—carries with it a number of legal deficiencies that time does not cure.
Federal law prohibits anyone who has served more than one year in prison from
possessing a firearm of any sort. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2008). Ten states currently
prohibit convicted felons from voting even after they are no longer associated with
the criminal justice system, while an additional ten states prevent felons from voting
if they have been released on probation or parole. ProCon.org, State Felon Voting
Laws
(2007),
available
at
http://felonvoting.procon.org/viewresource.asp?resourceID=286. Nonetheless, these
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often witness the breakups of their marriages and relationships while
in prison and have greater difficulty forming other relationships
(including friendships) upon their release.114 They experience greater
rates of unemployment.115 Ex-prisoners also suffer from more
debilitating health problems and far higher rates of incurable diseases
than the general population.116 And as we describe above, unlike the
loss of money—or even permanent physical injuries117—these types of
afflictions have severe long-term hedonic effects and are very difficult
to adapt to. In particular, unemployment and the dissolution of social
ties are two of the most reliable predictors of long-term unhappiness
and anxiety.118 Measured against an individual’s happiness before
being caught and convicted, life after prison bears in many respects a
greater resemblance to life in prison than it does to life before prison.
The ramifications of this deterioration of post-prison life are
two-fold.
First, it raises the possibility that consequentialist
calculations of the costs of punishment may again be biased—
downward, this time. Any cost-benefit analysis of punishment that
terminates when the criminal is released from prison would understate
the negative effects that begin or endure after the prison term has
finished.119 It is worth noting that these negative effects do not accrue
only to the former prisoner. Individual unemployment and social
dislocation impose significant negative externalities upon the rest of
society; the former prisoner frequently must be supported by state aid
and is more likely to commit further crimes.120
penalties are unlikely to have any significant hedonic effects. No study has shown
any hedonic impact from the loss of a capacity as circumscribed as the right to carry
a gun or to vote, and it seems implausible that the loss of such rights would register
hedonically on nearly the same magnitude as far more significant life events such as
births, deaths, illness, or financial shocks.
114
See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
115
See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
116
See Massoglia, supra note 67, at 57 & 296.
117
See Bronsteen, Buccafusco, & Masur, supra note 2 (describing adaptation to
certain types of debilitating physical injuries).
118
See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text.
119
See Levitt, supra note 97, at 346–47 (cataloguing a variety of prior studies
that fail to incorporate the post hoc costs of imprisonment to the prisoner); Becker,
supra note 98, at 179–80 (limiting discussion of the costs of punishment to those
incurred while the punishment is ongoing).
120
WESTERN, supra note 67 (finding strong effects of prison on unemployment
and future life prospects, including a 30% diminution in wages and an 11% decline
in the probability of getting married for African-American men); NEAL SHOVER,
GREAT PRETENDERS: PURSUITS AND CAREERS OF PERSISTENT THIEVES 146 (1996)

Happiness & Punishment

28

Second, the harsh impact of imprisonment on post-prison life
has uncertain but possibly damaging consequences for efforts to set
deterrence levels accurately. The initial problem, of course, is that
prison sentences exact a much greater toll than their term of years.
The question, then, is which actors within the criminal justice system
realize this fact ex ante, when the question of deterrence is relevant.
It is hard to be certain about the minds of the legislators who draft
sentencing codes, the judges who impose sentence, and especially the
putative criminals who contemplate committing illegal acts. Reliable
studies of this subject simply do not exist, perhaps because its hedonic
significance has not yet been fully appreciated.
In many cases, however, the silence is deafening. No
sentencing code directs judges to take account of the post hoc effects
of the punishments they are considering imposing.121 The public
record is similarly devoid of indications that politicians are concerned
about the lingering effects of prison upon convicted criminals.122
For potential offenders, the picture may not be quite so clear.
Criminals discount the future so strongly that some scholars believe
that even increasing prison terms beyond ten or twenty years provides
little additional deterrence.123 On the other hand, at least one study has
demonstrated that punitive measures that affect only life after prison—
in this case, laws that force convicted sex offenders to notify local
(“Most ex-convicts live menial or derelict lives and many die early of alcoholism or
drug use, or by suicide.”); Dermot Sullivan, Employee Violence, Negligent Hiring,
and Criminal Records Checks: New York’s Need to Reevaluate its Priorities to
Promote Public Safety, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 581, 596 (1998) (noting the
connection between unemployment and recidivism).
121
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2008) (directing federal judges to consider a
host of factors when imposing sentence, none of which relates to the prisoner’s postcorrectional experience).
122
The lone counter-example may be the treatment of juvenile offenders, who
have the opportunity to expunge convictions from their records in many states. See
T. Markus Funk, A Mere Youthful Indiscretion? Reexamining the Policy of
Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 885, 887 n.9
(1996) (collecting state statutes allowing for expungement of juvenile records). Of
course, the simple fact that a criminal record has been expunged will by no means
ameliorate all of the negative after-effects of prison, which are due as much to the
social separation imposed by prison as to the legal status of being a convicted felon.
See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
123
See generally WILSON & HERRNSTEIN, supra note 108 (describing the
extremely high discount rates of criminals and their effects on deterrence); see also
infra note 130 (approaching this question from the perspective of adaptation and the
post-hoc effects of imprisonment).
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residents when they are released from prison124—have demonstrably
positive effects on deterrence.125 For at least one population of
potential criminals, then, the post-prison effects of incarceration play a
meaningful role in ex ante decision-making.
This finding raises the implication that legislators and judges—
through their failure to consider the significant hedonic effects of
prison on post-prison life—have been systematically underestimating
the deterrent effect of prison sentences. Prospective criminals may be
figuring post hoc effects of imprisonment into the deterrent calculus;
policymakers almost surely are not. Policymakers thus may be overpunishing, failing to calibrate sentences accurately to achieve
necessary deterrence at the lowest possible hedonic cost.
Moreover, the straightforward problems with accuracy aside,
the manner in which the effects of punishment are actually felt greatly
complicates efforts to calibrate penalties to crimes. The difficulty
arises from the fact that much of the hedonic sanction involved in a
jail term is effectively front-loaded. The negative post-prison
repercussions of having served a prison term accrue to essentially any
convicted felon: the differences in post-prison outcomes between
felons who were incarcerated for shorter terms and those incarcerated
for longer terms are minimal.126 This implies that much of the pain
associated with incarceration is fixed, unchangeable once a felon has
served at least a few years behind bars. Consequently, for instance, a
two-year prison sentence is much more than fifty percent as punitive
as a four-year sentence.127 Tacking additional years onto the end of a

124

These laws were inspired by a New Jersey statute known as “Megan’s Law”
(after the child victim who inspired its passage). N.J.S. 2C:7-1 et seq. (2008). There
is now a federal mandate requiring every state to pass similar legislation. 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071(d)(2) (2008) (“The State or any agency authorized by the State shall release
relevant information that is necessary to protect the public concerning a specific
person required to register under this section . . . . The release of information under
this paragraph shall include the maintenance of an Internet site containing such
information that is available to the public . . . .”).
125
J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior? (unpublished manuscript 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100663, at 23–26 (finding that offender
notification laws reduced first-time commissions of crimes).
126
Massoglia, supra note 67, at 61; Schnittker & John, supra note 65, at 125
(“contact with the prison system is generally more important than the amount”).
127
This is true irrespective of criminals’ high discount rates, about which see
supra note 108. Precipitous discounting will cause criminals to view a four year
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prison sentence will alter the overall punitive calculation less than
intuition would suggest, particularly because the same years that
convicted criminals would have spent outside of prison (but, with
longer sentences, will now spend inside) would likely have been
unhappy ones.
This front-loading severely complicates efforts to achieve
marginal deterrence against first-time offenders. Any system of
punishment must impose heavier penalties for more serious crimes in
order to coerce criminals into committing less serious crimes
whenever possible.128 For instance, if burglary, armed robbery, and
murder were all punishable by life in prison, potential burglars might
elect to commit the more serious crime of armed robbery instead,
calculating that they have little to lose; similarly, burglars who were in
danger of being apprehended might not hesitate to commit murder. If
a significant proportion of the hedonic punishment for a crime attaches
after a single year in prison, and if potential offenders take the postprison ramifications of punishment into consideration when deciding
whether to commit a crime (a plausible assumption129), then the
variation in deterrence among different punishments begins to
disintegrate.130
The hedonic impact of post-prison punishment will also
interfere with the deterrence of recidivists, though not because they
possess any capacity to learn from their experiences. Rather, felons
sentence as less than half as harsh as a two year sentence; the post-prison hedonic
costs of incarceration will have a similar (and compounding) effect.
128
E.g., Eyal Zadir & Barak Medina, Law, Morality, and Economics:
Integrating Moral Constraints with Economic Analysis, 96 CAL. L. REV. 323, 379
n.211 (2008); Bentham, supra note 92, at 168.
129
See supra note 125 and accompanying text (finding evidence to support this
hypothesis).
130
That criminals have extremely high discount rates is now a commonplace.
See supra note 108. Economists, however, remain divided as to the theory behind
this criminal behavior, and no fully satisfying explanation has yet emerged. Our
argument, if it is correct, suggests the possibility that some behavior previously
explained through high discount rates may in fact be attributable to other causes.
Instead, offenders may be responding rationally to the front-loading of punishment
in jail sentences, understanding that much of the hedonic cost of being imprisoned
will accrue whether they are forced to serve two years or ten. (This would, however,
only apply to first-time criminals; recidivists, having been imprisoned once, will
have already been afflicted with most of the negative effects of having served time.)
This theory is, of course, highly contingent and highly tentative, but it raises
questions about prior assumptions regarding the level of information possessed by
first-time offenders.
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who have been convicted and imprisoned at least once already face
severely diminished happiness outside of prison due to the social and
economic dislocations caused by their prior stints behind bars. When
they contemplate whether to commit further crimes, they must weigh
the hedonic consequences of prison against their devalued postconviction lives, not their happier pre-prison lives. If putative
offenders have less to lose by being sent to jail, they will be more
likely to select crime over law-abiding behavior.
Of course, it is not news that convicted criminals face reduced
opportunities—particularly economic—after release from prison and
are more likely to opt for criminal activity as a result.131 To this welltread territory our analysis contributes two salient components. First,
these post-prison deprivations impose some of the most serious
hedonic injuries possible; few things are as debilitating to hedonic
well-being as unemployment and the breakup of social ties.132 And
second, these hedonic effects will persist; the conditions of being
unemployed or deprived of social ties are extremely difficult to adapt
to.133 The reduced opportunity costs that give rise to repeat offending
are unlikely to dissipate; more likely, they will persist throughout
much of the remainder of the criminal’s life. Thus, while adaptation to
punishment itself offers the promise of appropriate deterrence at a
reduced price, the post-prison cost of imprisonment threatens to
reverse that same calculation, heightening pain while inhibiting its
ability to deter.
*

*

*

For utilitarian theorists of punishment, hedonic adaptation
offers a mixed set of solutions and new problems. Adaptation loosens
131

For a small sampling of this extensive literature (here applied to sex
offenders), see Prescott & Rockoff, supra note 125, at 27–28 (finding that reduced
opportunities after conviction lead to greater rates of recidivism); W. Edwards & C.
Hensley, Contextualizing Sex Offender Management Legislation and Policy:
Evaluating the Problem of Latent Consequences in Community Notification Laws,
45 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIM. 83 (2001) (same); L. Presser &
E. Gunnison, Strange Bedfellows: Is Sex Offender Notification a Form of
Community Justice?, 45 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 299 (1999) (same); R.A. Prentky,
Community Notification and Constructive Risk Reduction, 11 J. OF INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 295 (1996) (same).
132
See supra notes 68–73 and accompanying text.
133
See supra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
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the link between deterrence and harm, suggesting that policymakers
will be able to achieve adequate deterrence while inflicting less pain
upon criminals. At the same time, the devastating hedonic effects of
incarceration upon post-prison life may have the opposite effect.
Punishment may well be more severe than any policymaker realizes,
and the ongoing nature of this punishment may skew both marginal
deterrence (as applied to first-time offenders) and overall deterrence
(as applied to recidivists).
However, these forces will not counterbalance. For most
criminals, the post-prison hedonic costs imposed by incarceration will
likely overwhelm the benefits of adaptation to prison simply because
they endure for much longer. Difficulties with deterrence introduced
by front-loaded punishment will only compound the problem. If
lawmakers and judges are to establish a workable punitive system,
they must find some means of circumventing the distortions
introduced by hedonic adaptation (and its absence).
IV. RETRIBUTIVE AND MIXED THEORIES
Most scholars today do not deem punishment justified solely
by its capacity to increase overall welfare. Instead, they focus at least
in part on the idea that a criminal deserves to be punished. This
retributive principle is for some the entire justification of punishment
and for others a supplement to or a limitation on the pursuit of
utilitarian objectives.
For a retributivist of any stripe, it is of core importance to
understand the actual amount of harm that punishment inflicts. The
retributive theory supplanted utilitarianism principally by emphasizing
that it is unacceptable to punish the innocent or to punish excessively
the guilty, even if doing so would increase utility. A cornerstone of
retributivism is thus that the state may impose suffering only on those
who deserve it (criminal offenders) and only in an amount that they
deserve (proportional to the severity of their wrongdoing). For most
retributivists, imposing deserved punishment is not only permissible
but also required. Imposing too much harm for a minor crime is
unacceptable under the theory, as is imposing too little harm for a
major crime. It would be wrong, on the retributivist account, to allow
a murderer to go unpunished or to give him an insufficiently severe
punishment (such as a small fine). Therefore, retribution can be
implemented only via a spectrum of punishments that impose varying
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degrees of harm. The level of harm must be adjusted to accord with
the offender’s desert.
If a criminal justice system offers only the blunt choice
between a small imposition of harm (a fine) and a large imposition of
harm (a prison term), then it denies the state the capacity to tailor a
punishment to fit the crime. This thwarts the system from fulfilling
the demands of retributive punishment theories. Moreover, if
increasing the amount of a fine or the length of a prison term does not
meaningfully increase the harm imposed on an offender, then any
quantum of punishment carries less retributive force than has been
supposed.
Adaptation dulls the punitive effect of fines and
incarceration, thereby changing the calculus by which a retributive
theory must assign amounts of punishment. If X amount of harm is
deserved, will a fine of N dollars be sufficient to impose that harm?
The answer must take into account the (large) effect of adaptation and
accordingly reduce the level of harm equated with the fine. This Part
considers several leading theories from the retributive family and
evaluates the extent to which those theories are affected by the
behavioral insights about punishment detailed in Part II.
A.

Pure Retributivism

Although utilitarianism134 was preeminent in both political
philosophy and punishment theory for most of the twentieth century, it
has been displaced in both arenas in the past few decades. In political
theory, the change can be traced primarily to the publication of John
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice. In punishment theory, there were several
134

Youngjae Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91
VA. L. REV. 677, 737-38 (2005) (“The purpose of punishment, under [the utilitarian]
view, is not to give each criminal what he or she deserves, but to deter future crimes,
to incapacitate criminals by keeping them ‘off the streets,’ or to rehabilitate criminals
so they would become better citizens.”); see also Steven Eisenstat, Revenge, Justice
and the Law: Recognizing the Victim’s Desire for Vengeance As a Justification for
Punishment, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1115, 1162 (2004) (“Utilitarians are forward
looking; they countenance punishment only if a social good will come from it.”);
Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of
Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 209 (2002) (“Whatever goal is
espoused, utilitarian-based punishment is always forward-looking, seeking to reduce
the intensity and gravity of crime in society. In other words, utilitarianism takes the
position that ‘bygones are bygones’ and that future consequences should be the sole
guide for sanctioning decisions.”).
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leading contributors.135 But the individual most closely identified with
the rise of retributivism as the leading theory of punishment is Michael
Moore,136 and his pure version of the theory is most representative of
the broad trend toward this non-consequentialist method of reasoning.
By applying the new psychological findings to this most
comprehensive and general form of retribution, we will have gone a
long way toward applying it to all forms of retribution.
Moore’s retributivism is not a mixed theory of punishment.
His definition of the word itself rules out any other value: “By
‘retributivist’ I refer to one who believes that the justification for
punishing a criminal is simply that the criminal deserves to be
punished.”137 The project of a retributivist is to illustrate that our
intuitions and considered judgments about punishment are captured
better by the idea that we punish due to moral desert than by the idea
that we punish to achieve aims such as deterrence, incapacitation, or
rehabilitation.138
The amount of suffering imposed must correspond to the
offender’s desert: “[R]etributivists at some point have to answer the
‘how much’ and ‘what type’ questions for punishments of specific
offences and they are committed to the principle that punishment
should be graded in proportion to desert . . . .”139 In short, Moore’s
pure retributivist theory holds that offenders must be punished, that
they must be punished only because they deserve it, and that the
amount of punishment must correspond to their level of desert.140
135

For perhaps the most influential early effort, see Herbert Morris, Persons and
Punishment, supra note 93.
136
See, e.g., MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW (1997).
137
Id. at 83.
138
See, e.g., Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of
Guideline Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 563 (2006) (“Although a retributivist
will welcome the positive consequences that punishment may incidentally yield —
for example, crime prevention or character reformation — they are not part of the
justification for punishment. Thus, a ‘retributivist punishes because, and only
because, the offender deserves it.’”).
139
See MOORE, supra note 136, at 88.
140
See Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1663 (1992) (“[R]etributive justice is concerned
with wrongful actions from which such harms result. Although a punishment may
sometimes involve the wrongdoer compensating her victim in some way, the
purpose of punishment is not to compensate the person for the harm suffered, but ‘to
right the wrong.’”).
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A necessary precondition to operationalizing that theory is an
understanding of the manner and degree to which fines and
imprisonment actually harm those who receive them. The findings
discussed in Part II affect pure retributivism in two ways. First, the
workings of our adaptive capacities mute the differences between
large and small fines as well as the differences between long and short
prison sentences. And second, adaptation decreases the level of harm
that an offender sustains from virtually any fine or period of
incarceration.
The first point is simply that if “punishment should be graded
in proportion to desert,” then in order to deliver the deserved
punishment, the state needs to be able to adjust the amount of imposed
harm to fit the severity of the crime. To do that, it relies on the
mechanism of increasing or decreasing the amount of a fine or the
length of a stay in prison. But as discussed above, such adjustments
do not do well in tracking adjustments in the amount of harm felt by
the offender. Although an offender will expect a larger fine or a
longer incarceration to decrease her happiness far more severely than a
smaller fine or a shorter incarceration, her expectation will mistakenly
ignore her own adaptive skills.
Even more so than utilitarianism and expressive theories of
punishment, which place at least some importance on the amount of
harm that a given punishment is perceived to impose, pure
retributivism concerns itself with the amount of harm actually
imposed. Its distinctive feature is the principle that to punish criminal
behavior is inherently right.141 If it is not possible to punish the right
amount, then it is not possible for justice to be done. Pure
retributivism thus requires a rethinking of the types of punishment that
are currently employed. Those types create the illusion of a spectrum
of available harms while in fact offering, more or less, only two. A
fine, however large, constitutes only a small diminution of an
offender’s happiness. And an incarceration, however brief, constitutes
a large diminution of such happiness.
People adapt so thoroughly to economic losses, and their
happiness depends so little on their wealth, that fines of varying sizes
141

See MOORE, supra note 136, at 105 (noting “the commitment of retributivism
. . . to the intrinsic goodness of punishing the guilty”); see e.g., Sigler, supra note
138, at 563 (“[P]unishment of the deserving is intrinsically good; its justification
does not depend on any further positive consequences that punishment might be
expected to produce.”).
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do not change much the well-being of those on whom they are
imposed. Similarly, people adapt surprisingly well to prison, so
staying in prison longer does not decrease happiness as much as one
would expect. This is all the more true because any prison term
dramatically decreases happiness after prison. Thus, getting out of
prison earlier is less valuable than it would appear, both because
prison itself is less bad than expected (due to adaptation) and because
the alternative of post-prison life is worse than expected.
Let us assume, purely for purposes of illustration, that a fine of
$100 is the deserved punishment for a certain instance of petty theft,
and that a prison term of five years is the deserved punishment for a
certain instance of assault with a deadly weapon. By “deserved
punishment,” we mean that those sentences would impose the amount
of harm deemed morally appropriate in each case by the retributive
theory. How would the state deal with crimes whose severity falls in
between those two? A larger fine will not impose much more harm
than the $100 fine, and a shorter prison term will not impose much less
harm than the five-year term. And how would a state respond to a
crime far more severe than the assault with a deadly weapon? No
matter how long an incarceration it hands down, that sentence will not
differ sufficiently from the five-year sentence (in terms of harm
imposed) to reflect the difference in deserved punishment.
This also relates to the second way in which adaptation is
relevant to retribution. Whatever punishment is currently thought
appropriate in response to a given crime will actually inflict less harm
on the offender than it would absent adaptation. When a theorist or
policymaker seeks to connect a crime with an appropriate punishment,
she must incorporate adaptation into her assessment of how much
harm the punishment will cause. Just as would-be offenders will
wrongly assume that the initial harm of a fine or imprisonment will be
sustained for a long time, theorists and policymakers are vulnerable to
making the same incorrect assumption.142 If they do so, then they will
set punishments that impose less harm than was deemed deserved—
i.e., punishments that do not satisfy the requirements of retribution.
This becomes even more clear when considering the way in
which Moore distinguishes his theory from the mixed theory of
limiting retributivism (discussed below). The mixed theory treats
desert and utility as necessary but not sufficient conditions for
punishment. Moore argues that we object to insufficient punishment
142

See Sevdalis & Harvey, supra note 110, at 248.
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regardless of utility, pointing to our negative reaction when heinous
crimes receive slaps on the wrist.143
Once again, we can translate Moore’s retributivism into penal
policy only if we understand how much harm a given punishment
actually inflicts. The premise is that to punish someone too little—
i.e., to inflict too light a harm—is a failure. If a fine of $1000 is
thought to inflict a certain amount of harm, but it actually inflicts only
half that harm due to hedonic adaptation, then we have not achieved
the retributivist objective.144 Absent an understanding of the powerful
effects of adaptation, retributivists risk systematic errors in the
calculus of punishment.
B.

Limiting Retributivism

Both retribution and utilitarianism have a profound influence
on actual penal policy in the United States, and a prominent mixed
theory of punishment reflects that reality. In this theory known as
limiting retributivism—which has been “adopted by most state
guidelines systems”145—retributive considerations set an upper and
lower bound on punishment,146 but within those bounds the sentence is
determined by utilitarian aims.147 After the bounds have been set by
the offender’s desert (measured principally by the severity of the
crime), the specific punishment is chosen “not only [by reference to]
143

See MOORE, supra note 136, at 98-99. This argument is the opposite of
limiting retributivism’s parsimony principle (the principle that we should punish no
more than needed to achieve the desired level of deterrence), because Moore
maintains that we fail to achieve the true goal of punishment if we punish too little.
As discussed below, though, limiting retributivism uses desert to set a lower bound
of punishment and therefore is not entirely insensitive to the demands of the
retributive theory.
144
As explained below, the consequences of adaptation for the parsimony
principle are the other side of the same coin: Adaptation allows us to achieve the
desired level of deterrence without inflicting as much harm.
145
Frase, supra note 96.
146
NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 179 (1982) (“‘[A]
deserved punishment does not mean the infliction on the criminal offender of a pain
precisely equivalent to that which he has inflicted on his victim; it means rather a
‘not undeserved punishment which bears a proportional relationship in a hierarchy of
punishments to the harm for which the criminal has been convicted.’”).
147
See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 58-84 (1974);
Frase, supra note 96; Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41
EMORY L.J. 1059, 1062 & n.8 (1992); see also John Bronsteen, Retribution’s Role,
84 INDIANA L.J. (forthcoming 2008).
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traditional crime-control purposes such as deterrence, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation, but also a concept known as parsimony—a
preference for the least severe alternative that will achieve the
purposes of the sentence.”148 Among other things, parsimony reflects
the acknowledgment that punishment is expensive.149
If less
punishment can achieve the desired end, then society gains monetarily
by eschewing a more severe alternative (in particular, a longer prison
sentence).
At first blush, it might seem that the effects of adaptation are
somewhat less problematic for limiting retributivism than for pure
retributivism. The mixed theory does not, after all, require that each
offender receive the precise amount of punishment that corresponds to
her level of moral desert. But adaptation is relevant to both parts of
the mixed theory (setting the bounds and fixing a specific punishment
within them) for the same reasons that it is relevant, in turn, to both
pure retributivism and pure utilitarianism.
When setting the lower and upper bound of punishment, a
limiting retributivist looks to the amount of harm that an offender
deserves to experience. The harm actually felt at each bound will be
influenced by the considerations discussed in Part II: because
offenders adapt to fines and imprisonment, they will experience less
harm than would otherwise be expected. This must be taken into
account when deciding which punishments correspond to the deserved
bounds of harm. It also must be considered when deciding how best to
fulfill utilitarian goals within the prescribed bounds. As explained in
Part III, any quantum of punishment may be expected (all else being
equal) to deter more than its actual harm would warrant because
adaptation will diminish the actual harm without diminishing the
expected harm.
If we are right that the available degrees of punishment are
overstated and that, to some considerable extent, only two significant
levels of punishment exist (any fine or any imprisonment), then those
two levels could be seen as a very rough way of setting the lower and
upper bounds prescribed by limiting retributivism. But large problems
would still present themselves. First, would those constitute the
bounds for every crime? The theory assumes that the lower and upper
bounds of acceptable harm will increase with the severity of the crime,
but this would not be feasible if only two main degrees of harm are
148
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available. Second, it would not be possible to make the adjustments
within the bounds that are needed to fulfill utilitarian goals—a
linchpin of the theory. If there are only two punishments, small and
large, then there is no way to carry out a theory predicated upon
making adjustments between two bounds.
Only the bounds
themselves are available as options. This denudes the theory of its
utilitarian element, leaving only the retributivist part remaining.
Adaptation does, however, make it easier for limiting
retributivism to achieve one of its principal goals: parsimony.
Because would-be offenders will overlook their own abilities to adapt,
less punishment is needed to achieve the deterrent aim, thereby saving
money and avoiding unnecessary (on this account) suffering. Just as
adaptation affects the analysis of utilitarian theories of punishment, it
affects the analysis of utilitarian elements within mixed theories.
C.

Expressive Theories

Throughout this Part, we have equated punishment with the
infliction of harm on an offender. If that is what punishment means,
then it follows almost by definition that a theory of punishment must
be sensitive to the connection between a sentence and the harm it
actually inflicts. If the goal of a sentence is to inflict the desired (i.e.,
deserved, or optimal) amount of harm, then the state can craft
appropriate sentences only if it understands the amount of harm they
will generate.
But understanding the connection between punishment and
harm might be less important for a theory that deemphasizes the
importance of harm. Expressive theories of punishment do just that.
As Dan Kahan wrote in one of the leading early papers challenging the
retributive/utilitarian dichotomy, “Punishment is not just a way to
make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that signifies
moral condemnation.”150 On this view, the important feature of
punishment is its expression of societal disapproval of the criminal
act.151 The harm inflicted on the offender is not the focus, either for
purposes of deterring crime or of meting out that which is deserved.
150
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An initial response that might be provoked by the expressive
theory is that the theory would presumably rely on harm at least as a
means of differentiating between the levels of disapproval expressed
in reaction to different crimes. If the purpose of punishment is to
express disapproval, then how does the state express more disapproval
for murder than for shoplifting? The most natural answer is to punish
murder more severely, as defined by inflicting more harm on a
murderer. This would suggest that the way in which punishment
actually causes harm would matter to expressive theories, even if its
importance were less direct than in the context of retribution or
utilitarianism.
But the story is not so simple. When the goal is to use
punishment to express condemnation, what matters might be perceived
rather than actual harm. If policymakers, offenders, and the public
alike believe that greater fines and prison sentences will harm
criminals more than smaller ones, then the state has at its disposal a
wide array of punishments with which to express the appropriate level
of condemnation in each case. Even if offenders are actually harmed
very differently from the way in which they are believed to be harmed,
the level of condemnation is unaffected because it depends upon
perception rather than reality.
We acknowledge that the behavioral insights about punishment
decline in importance as one focuses less on actual harm to an
offender and more on society’s (mistaken) perceptions of that harm.
But even the expressivists do not deny that actual harm has relevance.
One who places no importance on harm would be willing to hurt an
offender any amount in order to achieve a desired purpose. To rule
out the intentional punishment of the innocent, or the imposition of
excessive suffering in response to a petty crime, one must care about
actual harm and not only about perceived harm.152
In addition, a punishment system based entirely upon
perception rather than reality would constantly risk being undermined
by the truth. When members of the community see that an offender
seems perfectly content a short time after paying her fine, might they
152
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not eventually come to suspect that the fine constituted a less
satisfactory expression of disapproval than was originally thought?
Perhaps the answer is no, because the studies suggest that people do
not do well at learning about and predicting adaptation, even after
personal experience. Nonetheless, if an entire system depends purely
upon appearance, then presumably the caretakers of that system must
be sensitive to reality lest it leak out and destabilize the entire
structure.
Most expressivists would likely acknowledge the importance
of punishment’s true effects rather than arguing that only perception
matters. Consider the clever mixed theory advanced by Paul Robinson
and John Darley in their article The Utility of Desert.153 Robinson and
Darley argue that punishment can best achieve the aim of encouraging
compliance with the law if it embodies the community’s desert-based
standards of justice. Although this theory in name aims to achieve
utility by creating a retributive system, it possesses a central hallmark
of the expressive approach in that its goals depend more on the
perception of desert-based punishment than on its reality. If people
believe that community standards of retribution are being fulfilled,
then they will be more likely to comply with the law.154
Robinson and Darley, however, do not emphasize the
disconnect between perception and reality but rather focus their
attention in the opposite direction. One of the most appealing aspects
of their theory is that it envisions the law earning its credibility by
actually doing justice. The aim is to make people perceive the law as
just by having it actually be just.155 Among other things, “[t]he
criminal law must earn a reputation for punishing those who deserve it
. . . and where punishment is deserved, imposing the amount of
punishment deserved, no more, no less.”156
Imposing the deserved punishment, no more or less, requires of
course an array of punitive options that inflict varying degrees of harm
153
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to match the varying degrees of desert. New understandings of
adaptation indicate that we lack those options, thereby creating an
obstacle to the successful implementation of expressive theories just as
much as to that of retributive and utilitarian ones.
D.

Other Approaches to Retribution

In a very recent article, Paul Robinson has catalogued several
different forms of retributive theory.157 In particular, he describes
approaches to retribution as falling into three categories: vengeful,
deontological, and empirical. The vengeful approach has its roots in
the lex talionis—an eye for an eye—and sets the amount of deserved
punishment by reference to the harm suffered by the victim.158 The
deontological approach focuses not on the harm caused by the crime
but rather on the blameworthiness of the offender.159 Empirical
retributivism also emphasizes the offender’s blameworthiness but
measures it differently:160 whereas deontological retributivism uses
philosophical principles to arrive at the amount of deserved
punishment, empirical retributivism uses behavioral studies to learn
the community’s standards of desert and blameworthiness.161
All three forms of retributivism are challenged by the new
findings about the effect of punishment on happiness. Vengeful
retributivism demands that an offender “‘should suffer in the same
degree as his victim.’”162 To make that happen, the state must assess
the level of the victim’s suffering and then choose a punishment that
takes a similar toll on the criminal. This requires factoring in the
effect of adaptation on the harm that punishment will cause (as well as
its effect on the harm the victim suffered).163
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Deontological and empirical retributivism aim to ensure simply
“that the offender is given . . . that amount of punishment that puts him
in his proper ordinal rank among all cases of differing degrees of
blameworthiness.”164 Although they determine blameworthiness (i.e.,
desert) differently, they both require that more punitive harm be
imposed on more serious offenders. As in the case of vengeful desert,
this can be accomplished only by accounting for the effects of
adaptation on the actual harm created by punishment.
One last retributive theory that merits mention is
“consequentialist retributivism.”165 This is the idea that a state should
“maximiz[e] the total amount of desert-based punishment.”166 Police
and prosecutors with limited resources would aim to use those
resources efficiently, punishing as much as possible where warranted.
The police would “focus on the per-unit cost of deserved
punishment,”167 pursuing offenders with the highest ratio of desert168
to resources necessary for apprehension. Prosecutors would plea
bargain extensively to conserve time, making it possible to punish as
many offenders as much as possible, within the bounds of the
punishment they deserve.169
This approach is an attempt to operationalize retributive
theory, and as such it relates particularly well to our project of
identifying factors that determine the way in which theory can be put
into practice. As with all retributive theories, it limits punishment to
that which is deserved. Imposing harm above that limit in response to
any particular crime would be out of bounds, and so the theory must
be supplemented with an account of the way in which punishment
translates into harm. Our contribution is to supply that account.
V. CONCLUSION
More serious crimes should receive greater punishment than
less serious crimes, but the human capacity to adapt frustrates this core
requirement of any criminal justice system. A large fine will not
164
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ultimately diminish an offender’s happiness much more than will a
small one, nor will a long prison sentence impose much more suffering
than a short one. The state thus cannot drastically change the severity
of a punishment by adjusting the size of a fine or the length of an
incarceration.
By decreasing the prospects for proportional punishment,
adaptation restricts the penal system’s potential to achieve either
utilitarian or retributive goals. Instead of being able to tailor
punishments so as to increase utility or to reflect desert, the state
wields a blunt instrument that offers no way to avoid treating
dissimilar crimes similarly.
It might well be possible to find acceptable forms of
punishment that resist adaptation and enable proportionality in
sentencing to be achieved. But the task is not easy, nor the solution
readily apparent. For now, all we can offer is the unsettling evidence
that current forms of punishment do not impose harm in the ways or to
the degrees that they are assumed to do so. Neither utilitarian nor
retributivist theories of punishment can be convincing or complete if
they fail to account for this fact.
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